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INTRODUCTION 
Administrative constitutionalism, broadly understood, entails normative 
efforts by executive officials to apply the law in light of (1) its public-regarding 
purposes, liberally applied to advance the common good; (2) the Large “C” 
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Constitution, as interpreted purposively by the executive officials; and (3) the 
nation’s small “c” constitutional culture of historical, foundational 
commitments.1 As Professor Sophia Lee has explained, the engines of 
administrative constitutionalism have normally been agencies and their 
officials.2 But some of the greatest examples of administrative 
constitutionalism have been led by American Presidents and the White 
House and not by agency heads and administrators. 
Presidential constitutionalism has a distinctive origin in the duties of the 
President laid out in the Constitution. First, the President has a specified 
duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”3 For super-
statutes, congressional measures seeking to transform the status quo, the 
President’s charge is to implement the statute in a manner that advances the 
big goals set forth in the law. Second, the President’s oath of office commits 
her or him to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.”4 This entails the President’s obligation to enforce constitutional 
values and limits, including limits on the President’s authority. That 
obligation, in turn, requires the White House to deliberate about the meaning 
of the Constitution. Third, like other public officials, the President ought to 
act to “promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty” for 
all citizens, goals laid out in the Constitution’s Preamble.5 
Even this general description of presidential constitutionalism suggests 
its complexity. Is the President bound by constitutional rulings from the 
Supreme Court with which she or he disagrees? Should the President 
vigorously apply super-statutes that she or he thinks misguided? How does 
the President gauge the “general Welfare” and balance competing “Liberty” 
interests? However these issues are resolved by different administrations, the 
concept of presidential constitutionalism is a powerful and pervasive one. The 
modern Presidency has expanded opportunities for Large “C” as well as small 
“c” constitutional leadership by the officeholder. The President and Vice 
 
1 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 31-34 (2010); Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and 
Private Power to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191, 1193-94 (2011); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897-98 (2013); Professor Sophia Z. Lee, 
Introductory Remarks at the 2018 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium on The 
History, Theory, and Practice of Administrative Constitutionalism (Oct. 19, 2018). For a narrower 
articulation, see, for example, Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative 
Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 801 (2010) (defining 
“administrative constitutionalism” as “regulatory agencies’ interpretation and implementation of 
constitutional law” (emphasis omitted)). 
2 See generally Sophia Z. Lee, Our Administered Constitution:Administrative Constitutionalism from 
the Founding to the Present, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1699 (2019). 
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
4 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; see also id. art. VI, cl. 3. 
5 Id. pmbl. 
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President are the only officials elected by the entire country, and Presidents 
take their elections as popular mandates for big normative moves. As the head 
of a political party and armed with a veto authority, the President enjoys a 
great deal of legislative power. As the person who appoints federal judges, the 
President influences the judiciary as well. Not least important, everything the 
President says and does commands media attention and public comment. The 
bully pulpit of the office invites big policy and moral initiatives. 
This article will consider a particularly powerful example of presidential 
constitutionalism: the Obama Administration’s leadership on the issue of 
marriage equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and similar 
(LGBTQ+) persons. Presidential constitutionalism was effective because the 
chief executive articulated a robust principle (equal citizenship for sexual and 
gender minorities), application of that principle to the marriage issue was 
deeply deliberative within the executive branch and invited involvement by 
the judicial and legislative branches, and the process allowed the electorate to 
express its views. The combination of a robust principle, institutional 
deliberation, and popular feedback created conditions for immediate and 
powerful entrenchment of new rights for sexual and gender minorities. 
I. BARACK OBAMA: EVOLVING CANDIDATE AND HIS 
ADMINISTRATION 
A former professor of constitutional law, Senator Barack Obama was, like 
his opponent Senator Hillary Clinton, opposed to the Defense of Marriage 
Act of 1996 (DOMA), which excluded married same-sex couples from any 
federal law or rule relating to marriage or spousehood.6 Starting with an 
HRC/LOGO-sponsored candidates’ forum in August 2007, Senator Obama 
consistently favored equal rights and benefits for lesbian and gay couples (i.e., 
civil unions), but maintained that “we should try to disentangle what has 
historically been the issue of the word ‘marriage,’ which has religious 
connotations to some people, from the civil rights that are given to 
couples . . . .”7 
 
6 See Open Letter from Barack Obama to the LGBT Community, BILERICO PROJECT (Feb. 28, 
2008, 9:38 AM), 
http://bilerico.lgbtqnation.com/2008/02/open_letter_from_barack_obama_to_the_lgb.php 
[https://perma.cc/47TW-7HEV](supporting “complete repeal” of DOMA). 
7 Lynn Sweet, The Scoop from Washington, CHICAGO-SUN TIMES (Aug. 9, 2007), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20071014062914/http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2007/08/sweet_dem
_gay_forum_special_pa.html [https://perma.cc/8XAC-43LG] (emphasis added) (transcript of 
forum). On Obama’s “evolving” views on marriage, see David Garrow, RISING STAR: THE MAKING 
OF BARACK OBAMA 846, 865, 993, 1030 (2017)(chronicling Barack Obama’s views on same-sex 
marriage at various points in time); Tracy Baim, Obama Changed Views on Gay Marriage, WINDY 
CITY TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at 6 (“During his presidential campaign, he has remained consistent 
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At a presidential candidates’ forum hosted on August 16 by Reverend Rick 
Warren at the Saddleback Church in California, Senators McCain and 
Obama were both asked, “Define marriage.”8 Although Tobias Wolff (the 
LGBTQ+ policy adviser to the campaign) had implored the handlers to ask 
the candidate not to throw over gay couples entirely, Senator Obama 
answered: “I believe that marriage is the union between a man and a woman. 
Now, for me as a Christian,” he said as the audience applauded 
enthusiastically, “it’s also a sacred union. God’s in the mix.”9 Senator Obama’s 
opposition to marriage equality vexed his LGBTQ+ supporters. 
Longtime Chicago friend, ally, and adviser Valerie Jarrett maintains that 
Barack Obama was genuinely committed to completely equal treatment of 
gay persons in all matters civil, but that his religious faith told him that the 
sacred understanding of conjugal marriage required the exclusion of non-
procreating same-sex couples from the institution, as a matter of definition.10 
This is why he was attracted to civil unions, which gave LGBTQ+ couples 
exactly the same legal rights and benefits straight couples could secure by 
getting married—non-discrimination as a matter of legal rights—while 
respecting the “sacred” space marriage occupied in our society.11 If you frame 
marriage equality as a civil rights issue, akin to employment bars, you are 
likely to consider the marriage exclusion “discriminatory.” But if you frame it 
as a family or religious issue, you are likely to consider the marriage exclusion 
“definitional” and not discriminatory. Jarrett did not share her friend’s devout 
Christianity and supported marriage equality, but she respected his faith-
based reasons for civil unions rather than marriage.12 Obama himself says he 
did not see the definition of “marriage” as discrimination in the same way 
that the military exclusion was discrimination. He felt that civil unions were 
“a sufficient way of squaring the circle” in 2008.13 
David Axelrod, Senator Obama’s campaign manager in 2008, says that the 
candidate was not being completely candid. “Opposition to gay marriage was 
 
with his 2004 position, but clearly he has moved away from the 1996 statement of ‘I favor legalizing 
same-sex marriages.’”). 
8 Forum on Civil Leadership and Compassion, C-SPAN (Aug. 16, 2008), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?280492-1/forum-civil-leadership-compassion [https://perma.cc/XDM8-9ZPR] 
(transcript and video). 
9 Id.; Interview with Tobias Wolff, Professor, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., in Phila., Pa. (Sept. 25, 
2018). 




13 Ben Smith, Interview with President Barack Obama, BUZZFEED, (Feb. 11, 2015, 12:13 AM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/buzzfeednews/full-transcript-of-buzzfeed-news-interview-
with-president [https://perma.cc/58SY-JFWZ]; accord, BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF 
HOPE 222-23 (2006). 
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particularly strong in the black church, and as he ran for higher office, he 
grudgingly accepted the counsel of the more pragmatic folks like me, and 
modified his position to support civil unions rather than marriage, which he 
would term a ‘sacred union.’”14 Axelrod’s account resonates with the literature 
penned by freedom-to-marry activists, who claim credit for President 
Obama’s coming out of the closet on the marriage issue. Lawyer-blogger 
Kerry Eleveld and marriage advocates such as Marc Solomon and Evan 
Wolfson provide a roadmap for the President’s “evolution” that closely tracks 
pressure placed on the administration by activists.15 Their assumption was 
that the President was their ally all along but needed constant nudging and 
occasional left-of-center outrage to do the right thing.16 
Based on conversations with his supporters and fundraisers, my view is 
that Senator Obama was strongly and sincerely committed to the 
antidiscrimination norm, but also believed that it would have been difficult 
for any candidate who openly supported marriage equality to have been 
nominated by the Democratic Party or to have been elected President in 2008. 
There was a strategic feature to the Senator’s support for civil unions, rather 
than marriage, but there was also an underlying commitment to a 
constitutional process that the candidate believed would lead to marriage 
equality. I have dubbed such a process equality practice: advance equal treatment 
of an unfairly disparaged minority step by step, with opportunity for the public 
and the government to observe the consequences; there will be a learning curve 
that can be the basis for further deliberation and, possibly, reform.17 
Senator Obama’s view was that the most urgent federal gay rights issues 
were hate crimes legislation and repeal of the Clinton-era statute barring 
“homosexual” and “bisexual” persons from serving in the armed forces. Leave 
the marriage issue to the states for the time being. Massachusetts was issuing 
marriage licenses, and five states had created civil unions or domestic 
partnerships with all or most of the rights afforded married couples: 
California, New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. Other 
 
14 DAVID AXELROD, BELIEVER: MY FORTY YEARS IN POLITICS 447 (2015); see also RANDALL 
KENNEDY, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE COLOR LINE: RACIAL POLITICS IN THE OBAMA 
PRESIDENCY 22-28 (2012) (criticizing the President’s timid approach to marriage equality). 
15 See KERRY ELEVELD, DON’T TELL ME TO WAIT: HOW THE FIGHT FOR GAY RIGHTS 
CHANGED AMERICA AND TRANSFORMED OBAMA’S PRESIDENCY 65-94 (2015); The Freedom to 
Marry Oral History Project, Oral History of Evan Wolfson, Sixth Interview, April 14, 2016, at 213, 
http://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/roho/ucb/text/wolfson_evan_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7AK-
4KJN]. 
16 See, e.g., MARC SOLOMON, WINNING MARRIAGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW SAME-
SEX COUPLES TOOK ON THE POLITICIANS AND PUNDITS—AND WON 284-85 (2014) (describing 
the pressure placed on President Obama to “complete his evolution” on same-sex marriage). 
17 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF 
GAY RIGHTS 153-156 (2002). 
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states, such as Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, and New Jersey, offered some 
marital benefits to same-sex couples. Just as civil rights advocates had 
fought state-by-state to eliminate bars to different-race marriage after 
World War II, marriage equality advocates sought to achieve more 
advances at the state level before aiming for a Supreme Court 
pronouncement following Loving v. Virginia.18 
Senator Obama was elected President in November 2008. Between 2009 
and 2012, both the President and the country moved from civil unions to 
marriage. The Obama Administration played an important role in that shift. 
It did so by pervasively normalizing lesbian and gay relationships and by 
leading successful campaigns to overturn two problematic legacies from the 
Clinton presidency, namely, the no-gays-in-the-military statute and DOMA. 
Between 2013 and 2015, the administration would play a critical role in the 
Supreme Court’s decisions to invalidate DOMA and to require the states to 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 
II. MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 
In 2009, President Obama surrounded himself with an array of legal and 
policy advisers who were strong, dyed-in-the-wool egalitarians on issues of 
sexuality, gender, and the law. They included Vice President Joe Biden; 
Presidential Adviser Valerie Jarrett; White House Counsel (WHC) Greg 
Craig and Associate Counsel Alison Nathan; Director of the Office of Public 
Engagement Tina Tchen and her deputy, Brian Bond; Attorney General Eric 
Holder, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden and his Chief of Staff Stuart 
Delery, and Assistant Attorneys General Tony West and Tom Perez; David 
Barron and Marty Lederman in the Office of Legal Counsel; and Solicitor 
General Elena Kagan. Nathan, Delery, and Bond were openly lesbian or gay, 
as were many staff in the White House and Department of Justice (DOJ). 
Openly straight, Greg Craig had been counsel to the 1993 campaign to 
support gays in the military. When Elena Kagan was Dean of the Harvard 
Law School, she had led her faculty to oppose the Bush-Cheney 
Administration’s successful efforts to bully law schools into welcoming gay-
excluding military recruiters onto campus.19 
Nonetheless, LGBTQ+ issues were not a top priority when Barack 
Obama took the oath of office in January 2009. The financial crisis and then 
the campaign for health care reform occupied most of the administration’s 
 
18 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (striking down the remaining bars to different-race marriage based upon 
equal protection and the fundamental right to marry). 
19 See Brief for Professors William Alford et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (No. 04-1152), 2005 WL 
2367595 (Harvard professors’ brief). 
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attention. With regard to gay rights issues, the administration’s priorities 
were hate crimes legislation and a repeal of the armed forces exclusion.20 The 
marriage issue could not be completely ignored, however. A week before the 
inauguration, Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski interpreted a federal 
employee healthcare law to cover same-sex spouses, DOMA 
notwithstanding.21 And soon after the inauguration, Mary Bonauto met with 
Alison Nathan to give her a heads-up that Gay & Lesbian Advocates & 
Defenders (GLAD, which had brought marriage equality to Massachusetts) 
was filing a massive federal lawsuit challenging the application of DOMA to 
deny federal benefits and rights to legitimately married lesbian and gay 
couples in Massachusetts. On March 3, 2009, GLAD filed Gill v. Office of 
Personnel Management.22 
In the next several months, the legislatures in Vermont, Connecticut, New 
Hampshire, and Maine passed marriage equality statutes, and the Iowa 
Supreme Court required marriage equality under its state constitution. The 
Obama Administration caught sharp criticism from the gay blogosphere 
because there was little discernible progress on the armed forces ban and 
because it had not properly celebrated the new marriage victories in those 
five states.23 Behind the scenes, however, the administration was already 
focusing on this issue. 
On May 18, 2009, for example, the New York Times ran the story of Janice 
Langbehn and Lisa Pond, longtime partners who had been enjoying a Rosie 
O’Donnell Cruise with their three children when Pond collapsed from a brain 
aneurysm.24 The Miami hospital that received Pond refused Langbehn access 
to her dying partner, even after she produced medical power of attorney 
documents.25 Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel and the President were outraged 
by the article. Danielle Gray, Associate Counsel to the President, worked with 
Deputy White House Counsel Daniel Meltzer to develop a proposal that 
family visitation, broadly defined, could be required of all hospitals receiving 
federal Medicare/Medicaid funds. Secretary Kathleen Sebelius of the 
 
20 David A. Graham, Robert Gates, America’s Unlikely Gay-Rights Hero, THE ATLANTIC (July 
28, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/robert-gates-boy-scouts-gay-
leaders/399716/ [https://perma.cc/ZMH4-CZMG]. 
21 In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 2009). 
22 See Complaint at 1, Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp.2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 
1:09-CV-10309). 
23 See, e.g., ELEVELD, supra note 15, at 65-71; Andrew Sullivan, Barack Obama’s Gay Marriage 
Evolution, NEWSWEEK (May 13, 2009), https://www.newsweek.com/andrew-sullivan-barack-
obamas-gay-marriage-evolution-65067 [https://perma.cc/YH3N-RNCR]. 
24 See Tara Parker-Pope, Kept from a Dying Partner’s Bedside, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/health/19well.html [https://perma.cc/8B4N-RHR9]. My 
account of the administration’s reaction is taken from conversations with White House personnel. 
25 Id. 
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Department of Health and Human Services strongly endorsed such a 
proposal—though the White House held off from implementing the idea 
until the Affordable Care Act was passed in March 2010. A White House 
memorandum was issued the next month.26 
III. SMELTDOWN 2009: MARRIAGE CANNOT BE IGNORED 
In early 2009, the DOJ recalibrated its litigation approach in cases 
challenging armed forces and civil service discriminations against gay persons 
and couples. Tony West, the new head of the Civil Division, personally 
reviewed briefs to make sure that they presented only arguments that did not 
disparage LGBTQ+ persons and their relationships.27 Responding to a 
DOMA challenge brought by Arthur Smelt and Christopher Hammer, DOJ 
attorneys drafted a comprehensive memorandum supporting a motion to 
dismiss. In Part IV, the draft memorandum argued that states do not have to 
recognize marriages contrary to their public policy and cited cases where 
states declined to recognize incestuous or child marriages; West left this 
discussion alone.28 In Part V, the draft argued that DOMA was consistent 
with equal protection, because of the rational policy of encouraging 
responsible procreation and the discretion Congress has to adopt a “wait-and-
see” attitude toward innovations in state marriage law.29 By maintaining a 
policy of “neutrality”—neither banning same-sex marriages nor subsidizing 
them—DOMA respected state autonomy and self-governance and preserved 
scarce enforcement resources.30 West eliminated the responsible procreation 
argument, and the Department filed its memorandum and motion on June 11, 
2009. 
Pushback from the LGBTQ+ community was immediate and hard. On 
the AMERICAblog, an influential progressive blog established in 2004, John 
Aravosis objected that the Obama Administration was making the same 
objectionable arguments that the Bush Administration had been making.31 
 
26 See Memorandum on Respecting the Rights of Hospital Patients to Receive Visitors and to 
Designate Surrogate Decision Makers for Medical Emergencies, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,511 (April 15, 2010); 
see also Telephone Interview with Brian Bond, former Deputy Director, White House Office of Pub. 
Engagement (April 30, 2017); Telephone Interview with Marty Lederman, former Deputy Assistant 
Legal Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice (June 30, 2019). 
27 See Telephone Interview with Tony West, former Assistant Attorney General, Civil Div., 
Dep’t of Justice (May 8, 2017). The discussion in this paragraph is taken from this interview. 
28 See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 21-22, Smelt v. United States, No. 
SACV09-0286 DOC (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009), 2009 WL 1683906. 
29 See id. at 23. 
30 See id. at 33-37. 
31 See John Aravosis, Obama DOJ Lies to Politico in Defending Hate Brief Against Gays, 
AMERICABLOG (June 12, 2009, 1:26 PM), http://americablog.com/2009/06/obama-doj-lies-to-
politico-in-defending-hate-brief-against-gays.html, [https://perma.cc/ZZ69-WXC3]; see also 
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Aravosis argued that the administration could have chosen to raise purely 
procedural objections, but instead, “what Obama did was throw the legal 
kitchen sink at us in a brief that could have been written by Antonin Scalia” 
(a comparison that both Obama and Scalia would find offensive).32 “Where 
in the law does it say that Obama was required to compare gay marriage to 
incest?”33 The bloggers were casting all the responsibility on the President, 
who of course had not read the brief, though others in the White House and 
in the campaign team had seen it.34 Valerie Jarrett met with some of the 
bloggers and assured them that the White House was listening.35 Increasingly, 
she turned to Brian Bond to help her spot flashpoints like this. After June 11, 
every DOJ filing in a gay rights case was reviewed by the White House 
Counsel, where Ali Nathan, Kate Shaw, and Ian Bassin could spot sensitive 
statements and arguments. This greatly expanded the office’s workload—and 
generated what the lawyers and Brian Bond would call “Team Gay,” the 
White House officials who specialized in delivering on the administration’s 
promise to promote equal rights for LGBTQ+ Americans. Meeting regularly, 
Team Gay started researching the constitutionality of DOMA and Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell, as well as the administration’s duties to defend those measures (or 
not) in court.36 
Later in June, Tony West, Elena Kagan, and other DOJ attorneys met 
privately with representatives of LGBTQ+ rights organizations, both to 
reassure those representatives and to educate their own attorneys that the 
administration would not file litigation documents disparaging lesbian and 
gay relationships and marriages.37 
Meanwhile, Team Gay was working hard on deliverables—tangible 
recognition and benefits for lesbian and gay families within existing statutory 
directives and mechanisms for implementing new regulatory policies. Thanks 
to the efforts of Team Gay, John Berry and the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM), and Hillary Clinton and Harold Koh at the State 
 
NATHANIEL FRANK, AWAKENING: HOW GAYS AND LESBIANS BROUGHT MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
TO AMERICA 199-201 (2017) (discussing the frustration felt by LGBTQ+ advocates at the Obama 
Administration’s reticence on gay issues). 
32 Aravosis, supra note 31. 
33 Id. 
34 The White House sent Professor Wolff a copy of the Smelt brief the night before it was filed. 
See Wolff Interview, supra note 9. I was also told that the White House Counsel’s office reviewed a 
copy of the brief. That office and Wolff made suggestions that were not implemented, assertedly 
because of time pressure. 
35 See FRANK, AWAKENING, supra note 31, at 199-201. 
36 See Telephone Interview with Brian Bond, former Deputy Director, White House Office of 
Pub. Engagement (April 13, 2017); see also ELEVELD, supra note 15, at 86-88 (describing post-Smelt 
coordination on LGBTQ+ issues). 
37 See Bond Interview, supra note 36. 
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Department, the White House on June 17 issued a memorandum on “Federal 
Benefits and Non-Discrimination.”38 Although the administration was “not 
authorized by Federal law to extend a number of available Federal benefits to 
the same-sex partners of Federal employees,” the memorandum “identified 
areas in which statutory authority exists to achieve greater equality for the 
Federal workforce through extension to same-sex domestic partners of 
benefits currently available to married people of the opposite sex.”39 
Secretary Clinton extended relocation and other benefits to same-sex 
partners the next day.40 After considering overwhelmingly supportive public 
comments, OPM expanded bereavement and other leave policies to include 
same-sex domestic partners as “family members,” though it ultimately 
concluded that spousal insurance benefits to such partners and other matters 
were beyond the scope of its mandate.41 The June 17 memorandum directed 
all other executive departments and agencies to work with OPM to determine 
whether they could extend same-sex domestic partnership benefits to federal 
employees affected by their statutory mandates.42 
On June 29, Barack and Michelle Obama hosted a reception in the East 
Room of the White House to celebrate Gay Pride Month. The President 
recognized the impatience of many in the room but observed that progress 
had been made, and promised that greater progress was to come.43 The next 
week, the President called a meeting in the Roosevelt Room, the large West 
Wing conference room dominated by two large portraits of Teddy and 
Franklin Roosevelt, aggressive chief executives who wielded the presidential 
bully pulpit for progressive causes.44 Attendees included President Obama 
(who was not present for the entire meeting) and his senior advisers Valerie 
Jarrett, Rahm Emmanuel, David Axelrod, and Jim Messina; Joe Biden and 
Ron Klain (Biden’s chief of staff); Tina Tchen and Brian Bond; Greg Craig 
and Alison Nathan; and several DOJ lawyers, but not Tony West, who 
excused himself from this meeting for reasons of DOJ independence. 
 
38 See Memorandum on Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,393 (June 
17, 2009). 
39 Id. at 29,393. 
40 See Press Release, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Benefits for Same-Sex 
Domestic Partners of Foreign Service Employees (June 18, 2009), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/06/125083.htm [https://perma.cc/7TU4-Q658]. 
41 Absence and Leave; Definition of Family Member, Immediate Relative, and Related Terms, 
75 Fed. Reg. 33,491, 33,495 (June 14, 2010) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 630). 
42 See Memorandum on Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination, supra note 38, at 29,393. 
43 For a video of the President’s remarks, see Gay Pride Month Reception, C-SPAN (June 29, 
2009), https://www.c-span.org/video/?287350-2/gay-pride-month-reception 
[https://perma.cc/NL7S-H97M]. 
44 My account of the July 2009 Roosevelt Room meeting is drawn from conversations with 
several attendees. See also ELEVELD, supra note 15, at 87-88. 
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There was a consensus that the administration was committed to equal 
rights for LGBTQ+ Americans, but there was not unanimity as to how to 
prioritize that commitment. Team Gay (represented by Nathan) was gung-
ho for equality, but the political team (Emanuel, Axelrod, Messina) was 
reluctant to sacrifice other priorities. Floating above the strategic differences, 
the Commander-in-Chief issued some marching orders. Attendees recalled 
the President’s saying something like this: “I am not going to act like the 
previous administration; we are going to follow the law. What I want you to 
do is find me a legal path to advance the rights of gay and lesbian families. I 
am willing to take hits in the political arena,” a statement that made Axelrod 
and Emanuel cringe, “but I am not willing to violate the law.” Craig and 
Nathan nodded in agreement. The immediate mandate was to coordinate 
more deliverables for the benefit of LGBTQ+ families.45 
On August 24, 2009, the government filed its reply brief in Smelt. It 
opened with a statement that: 
[T]his Administration does not support DOMA as a matter of policy, 
believes that it is discriminatory, and supports its repeal. Consistent with the 
rule of law, however, the Department of Justice has long followed the practice 
of defending federal statutes as long as reasonable arguments can be made in 
support of their constitutionality, even if the Department disagrees with a 
particular statute as a policy matter, as it does here.46 
On August 24, 2009, the judge dismissed the Smelt case on one of the 
procedural grounds advanced by the government.47 
On September 18, 2009, when the government moved to dismiss the equal 
protection claims in Gill (the GLAD challenge to DOMA), it explicitly 
abjured the responsible procreation and optimal parenting arguments.48 
Under First Circuit precedent, the government only had to justify DOMA’s 
sexual orientation discrimination by demonstrating a rational basis. The 
memorandum tepidly rested its case on administrative convenience. “Given 
the evolving nature of this issue,” Congress foresaw that the meaning of 
federal rights based upon marriage “would vary dramatically from State to 
State. Congress could reasonably have concluded that there is a legitimate 
 
45 The account in this paragraph and the quotation in text are paraphrases from an April 13 
interview with Brian Bond. See Bond Interview, supra note 36. 
46 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, Smelt v. United 
States, No. SACV09-00286 DOC (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009), 2009 WL 2610458. 
47 Smelt v. United States, No. SACV09-00286 DOC, 2009 WL 10674308, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 24, 2009). 
48 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss at 19 n.10, Gill v. Office 
of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-CV-10309), 2009 WL 5803678. 
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government interest in maintaining the status quo and preserving nationwide 
consistency in the distribution of marriage-based federal benefits.”49 
IV. EQUAL CITIZENSHIP FOR LGBTQ+ AMERICANS 
Like racial minorities and women, sexual and gender minorities had been 
subjected to a long history of unfair state discrimination. At the June 29 
White House Pride celebration, the President pledged his support for an 
ambitious overhaul of federal law to implement a regime of completely equal 
treatment of sexual and gender minorities. The proposed overhaul included 
the repeal of DOMA. The administration’s efforts coincided with the 
increasing success of the marriage equality movement at the state level and 
in national opinion polls. 
A. Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation as Suspect Classifications? 
Supreme Court precedent suggested that a classification required 
heightened equal protection scrutiny if (1) the burdened group had suffered 
an unfair history of arbitrary discrimination (2) based on an immutable trait 
(3) that was generally irrelevant to proper public policy, and (4) they were 
politically unable to remedy the discrimination through the normal political 
process.50 Early on, the Obama Administration signaled that discrimination 
because of gender identity was flat-out sex discrimination and, therefore, 
presumptively unconstitutional.51 
On September 10, 2009, lawyers from GLAD, Lambda Legal, the ACLU, 
the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and the Human Rights Campaign 
came to the White House to discuss the marriage issue with DOJ and White 
House lawyers, including Tony West and Ali Nathan. In a detailed 
memorandum, the movement lawyers urged the administration to concede 
that sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification because it 
met the foregoing requirements developed by the Supreme Court to treat 
race and sex as suspect classifications.52 They also queried: Why was the 
Obama Administration still defending DOMA, which was a statute saturated 
 
49 Id. at 16-18; cf. Lynn Wardle, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Deciding, Democracy, 
and the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 951, 970 (2010) (arguing that the memorandum did not 
present a “high quality or serious defense” of DOMA). 
50 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985) (setting forth 
the four criteria for heightened scrutiny). 
51 The Obama Administration did not seek an appeal of Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 
293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that gender identity discrimination against transgender employees 
is “discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’”). 
52 Memorandum from ACLU, GLAD, HRC, Lambda Legal, Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights to 
Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Div. Dep’t of Justice 1-2 (Sept. 9, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
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with anti-gay animus of the sort that Romer and Lawrence condemned?53 In a 
subsequent memorandum, the lawyers strongly urged DOJ to “disavow 
morality as a justification for DOMA Section 3” and to “disavow conservation 
of resources” as well.54 
Within the Obama White House, Team Gay strongly agreed even before 
the September 10 meeting: it made no more sense to exclude gay people from 
marriage equality than it did to exclude people of color.55 The DOJ’s Civil 
Division, headed by West, was responsible for defending against 
constitutional challenges to federal statutes—including the military exclusion 
as well as DOMA—and for institutional reasons was more reluctant to accept 
the LGBTQ+ stance on constitutional scrutiny. 
If the executive branch concluded that DOMA was unconstitutional, what 
should its officials actually do? Based upon the President’s oath of office and 
duty to faithfully execute the law (including the Constitution), some 
academics have maintained that the President has a duty not to apply statutes 
he or she considers unconstitutional.56 Other academics and most appellate 
lawyers, however, believe that the President should continue to apply 
unconstitutional laws until there is an authoritative judicial declaration of 
their invalidity, because the rule of law depends upon each branch’s deferring 
to the Supreme Court as the decider of constitutional issues.57 The Office of 
the Solicitor General has long considered this its gospel, and it has sometimes 
defended statutes that its Presidents believed unconstitutional.58 
The White House lawyers were particularly impressed by the practical 
wisdom found within the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). The Solicitor 
General had traditionally recognized, as an exception to the duty to defend, 
statutes that reflected congressional aggrandizement at the expense of the 
 
53 Id. at 5-6. 
54 Memorandum from ACLU, GLAD, HRC, Lambda Legal, & Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights 
to Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Div., Dep’t of Justice 1, 3 (Sept. 11, 2009) (on file 
with author). 
55 Our account of Team Gay’s thinking is based upon numerous personal interviews and emails 
from internal White House sources. See Bond Interview supra note 36. 
56 E.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
507, 509 (2012); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What 
the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 228-62 (1994). For analysis of state practice, see generally Katherine 
Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the States, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2014). 
57 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997). 
58 See, e.g., Oral Argument, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Nos. 43, 44, 46, 47), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/43-orig [https://perma.cc/WMV8-CXTX] (audio of the Solicitor 
General’s argument for the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 
notwithstanding President Nixon’s view that the lower voting age required a constitutional 
amendment). 
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executive branch, a practice inapplicable to DOMA.59 An additional but 
controversial exception was the decision of Acting Solicitor General John 
Roberts refusing to defend the FCC’s policy favoring race diversity in 
programming.60 Most persuasive to the White House Counsel, the Clinton 
Administration’s OLC opined that a 1995 congressional bar to military service 
by HIV-positive persons was unconstitutional and recommended that the 
executive branch implement the discriminatory provision but not defend its 
constitutionality. The courts never reached that issue, because Congress 
repealed the HIV ban before it took effect.61 
White House Counsel found OLC’s “Don’t Defend, Do Enforce” 
approach to DOMA most persuasive. There was pushback from Daniel 
Meltzer, Deputy White House Counsel. In the modern era, the executive 
branch has abandoned statutes where there was no colorable constitutional 
argument and where Congress was usurping presidential or executive branch 
authority. Meltzer rejected a third group of cases, including Roberts’s refusal 
to defend the FCC diversity policy. This category should be vanishingly small 
because presidential objections are best expressed through the veto power or 
efforts to repeal offensive legislation, like the HIV ban.62 Looking ahead to 
future government actors, any departure from this baseline threatens to 
politicize the enforcement of statutes, a highly undesirable state of affairs. If 
the current administration felt DOMA was just too wretched to defend, what 
would prevent the next administration from abandoning the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA)? White House attorneys dubbed this the “Sarah Palin argument”: 
If the duty to defend norm were weakened now, what would stand in the way 
of a Palin Administration declining to defend the ACA and other regulatory 
statutes? 
 
59 See Presidential Auth. to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 
201 (1994) (“The President has enhanced responsibility to resist unconstitutional provisions that 
encroach upon the constitutional powers of the Presidency.”). 
60 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Metro Broad., Inc. 
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453), 1989 WL 1126975. 
61 See Dawn E. Johnsen, The Obama Administration’s Decision to Defend Constitutional Equality 
Rather Than the Defense of Marriage Act, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 608-10 (2012) (setting forth the 
history of the HIV ban and the Clinton Administration’s response); see also Dawn E. Johnsen, 
Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Winter/Spring 2000, at 7 (presenting a detailed defense of executive branch duty to enforce 
questionable laws, with more discretion not to defend them). 
62 See Daniel Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1221-24 (2012). 
My off-the-record interviews with White House and Department of Justice personnel establish that 
Meltzer made the same arguments against a Don’t Defend, Do Enforce approach to DOMA. 
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B. Administrative Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Unions 
White House Counsel’s primary agenda was still to figure out and develop 
agency deliverables for lesbian and gay couples. Between July 2009 and July 
2011, Team Gay helped coordinate three different kinds of actions that assured 
new benefits and rights for many families: (1) liberal interpretation of broad 
statutory terms and provisions to include same-sex couples and their families; 
(2) promulgation of new rules, such as the hospital visitation rule, that created 
new regulatory categories to include LGBTQ+ families; and (3) exercising 
discretion not to apply existing law harshly against such families. On April 
27, 2010, for example, the Department of Justice interpreted the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA) to include gender-motivated violence against 
persons of the same sex.63 Because of DOMA, VAWA’s protection of 
“spouses” could not protect lesbian and gay couples, but the law also protected 
“intimate partners” and “persons,” which OLC interpreted to protect same-
sex partners.64 On June 22, 2010, the Department of Labor interpreted the 
Family and Medical Leave Act to assure mandatory leave for same-sex 
couples caring for children and one another.65 
On June 2, 2010, the President directed all agencies to work with OPM to 
extend benefits to same-sex domestic partners and their families wherever 
possible consistent with the law.66 Specifically, the memorandum directed 
OPM and the General Services Administration to make sure that children 
raised in lesbian and gay households qualify as “child” for federal child care 
subsidies, federal employee assistance programs include “domestic partners,” 
federal retirement programs shall award annuities on the death of retirees to 
their same-sex partners, that LGBT families receive appropriate relocation 
expenses, and that lesbian and gay federal employees can receive unpaid leave 
to care for their families.67 “In the future, all agencies that provide new 
benefits to the spouses of Federal employees and their children should, to the 
extent permitted by law, also provide them to the same-sex domestic partners 
of their employees and those same-sex domestic partners’ children.”68 
Many of the persons harmed by DOMA were binational couples, where 
an American citizen was married to a partner of the same sex who was not a 
 
63 See generally Whether the Criminal Provisions of the Violence Against Women Act Apply 
to Otherwise Covered Conduct When the Offender and Victim Are the Same Sex, 34 Op. O.L.C. 
1 (2010). 
64 See id. at 1. 
65 See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator Interpretation (June 22, 2010), 
at 2-3. 
66 See Memorandum on Extension of Benefits to Same-Sex Domestic Partners of Federal 
Employees, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,247, 32,248 (June 2, 2010). 
67 Id. at 32,247-48. 
68 Id. at 32,248. 
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citizen.69 Immigration law threw up all sorts of barriers to such relationships, 
but the Obama Department of Homeland Security exercised its enforcement 
discretion in a number of cases involving undocumented LGBT persons or 
families.70 That discretion included policies where border agents failed to 
exclude such persons or families from entering the country, police or 
prosecutors delayed or failed to initiate removal proceedings against 
undocumented spouses and partners, and officials declined to enforce removal 
orders or decisions regarding detention or parole.71 
C.Legislation Against LGBTQ+ Discrimination 
The Obama Administration made hate crime legislation a priority in the 
111th Congress (2009-11). The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act of 2010 was attached as a rider to the National 
Defense Authorization Act.72 With bipartisan support, the bill survived a 
Senate filibuster and breezed through both chambers. The President signed 
it into law on October 28, 2009. The statute expanded the 1969 federal hate 
crime law to enhance the penalties for crimes motivated by a victim’s actual 
or perceived gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.73 
In his second State of the Union Address, President Obama highlighted 
his proposal to repeal the armed forces exclusion of gay and bisexual 
persons,74 and in March the Department of Defense set in motion a study 
group to investigate the wisdom of opening the armed forces to openly gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual persons.75 On October 12, 2010, District Judge Virginia 
Phillips ruled that the 1993 statutory exclusion of gay soldiers violated the First 
Amendment rights of gay people who wanted to serve in the armed forces.76 
 
69 See Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal Law, 
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 629 (2012). 
70 Id. at 642-43. 
71 See id. at 632-42 (providing many examples of discretionary non-enforcement of 
immigration bars and commands). 
72 Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 249 
(2012). 
73 Id. at § 249(2). 
74 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address 
[https://perma.cc/5KTB-DBR9]. 
75 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” 1-2 (2010) (describing the 
Department’s research on these issues between March 2 and November 30, 2010). 
76 See Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 888 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see 
also Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political Representation and Accountability Under Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 1633, 1638 (2004) (arguing that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell offends First Amendment values 
such as “the ability of citizens to communicate effectively with their political representatives, and 
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Judge Phillips’s ruling was a wake-up call. Did the armed forces want to 
manage the transition itself or suffer under a judicially supervised transition? 
On November 30, 2010, the Defense Department released its exhaustive study 
concluding that soldiers were ready for openly gay and lesbian colleagues.77 
Although the Democrats had just taken a shellacking in the midterm elections 
and legislators wanted to let the issue lapse, the President insisted on pressing 
for repeal legislation in the lame duck session of the 111th Congress. Three 
days before Christmas 2010, the President signed the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
Repeal Act of 2010, which set in motion an administrative process that ended 
the exclusion on September 21, 2011.78 
The repeal of the military exclusion was a momentous symbolic 
recognition of the equal citizenship of lesbian, gay, and bisexual Americans. 
Much as the end of racial segregation in the armed forces helped prepare the 
way for the end of racial segregation in marriage, the opening up of the 
military to gay people helped prepare the way for opening up marriage as 
well. Consider Chief Justice Taney’s infamous opinion in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, which denied basic citizenship to free black people based in part on 
laws criminalizing interracial marriage.79 Taney also relied on state and 
federal laws barring freed black persons from serving in the militia. “Nothing 
could more strongly mark the entire repudiation of the African race. . . . [H]e 
is not, by the institutions and laws of the State, numbered among its people. 
He forms no part of the sovereignty of the State, and is not therefore called 
on to uphold and defend it.”80 Although the Reconstruction Amendments 
overrode the precise holdings of Dred Scott, it was not until 1948 that America 
rejected its premises about military service and not until 1967 that America 
renounced its assumptions about marriage. Just as Ken Karst has argued that 
military service has been an important gateway to full citizenship for 
Americans of color, women, and gay people,81 even more fundamental has 
been progress in eliminating discriminatory treatment of racial minorities, 
women, and gay people in American family law. 
The repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell undercut DOMA in some very 
specific ways as well. During the Defense Department’s Working Group 
deliberations, Colonel James Clapsaddle argued that once gays were “our men 
 
the imperative that a democratic system of government be responsive to criticism and calls for 
political change”). 
77 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 75, at 3. 
78 See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (Dec. 22, 2010). 
79 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
80 Id. at 415, 420. 
81 See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 
UCLA L. REV. 499, 545-81 (1991) (drawing on the history of desegregation in the armed forces to 
discuss the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from the armed forces). 
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and women,” DOMA had to go.82 The top brass wanted all soldiers to enjoy 
the same rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Additionally, the military 
exclusion was an occasion for an astounding show of GOP support for gay 
rights. Ken Mehlman (former Chairman of the Republican National 
Committee) came out as gay and worked hard for the repeal, after which he 
put the Gill Action Fund into contact with several GOP mega-donors for the 
marriage cause.83 Eight Republican senators (all lobbied by Mehlman) voted 
for the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell repeal.84 
The repeal of the military exclusion also undermined the credibility of 
the Pandora’s box argument against marriage equality: if you redefine 
marriage, you will unleash untold demons and evil consequences. Pandora’s 
box was the only argument left against repealing Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. In 
March 2009, a statement ultimately signed by 1,167 retired generals and 
admirals predicted that gays in the military would “break” the all-volunteer 
armed forces by crippling recruitment, retention, and cohesion.85 Yet when 
the President pronounced the final demise of the exclusion on September 21, 
2011, few even noticed. Two verifiable resignations (chaplains) resulted from 
the new policy, and the most thorough study of the effects found zero impact 
on military recruitment and retention and no net change in perceived unit 
cohesion.86 In 1993, Pandora’s box fears had been pervasive: the mere presence 
of the open homosexual might frighten away recruits, render young soldiers 
hysterical, and destabilize the barracks.87 In 2011, Pandora actually opened the 
box, and nothing came out. This was a big moment in the normalization of 
gay people, much as President Truman’s racial desegregation of the armed 
forces helped integrate people of color into the body politick. 
V. ATTORNEY GENERAL HOLDER’S LETTER OF FEB. 23, 2011 
Lawsuits by the LGBTQ+ movement groups forced the Obama 
Administration to take public actions informed by the equal citizenship 
precept that had driven the repeal of the military exclusion. Throughout 2010, 
 
82 Wolff Interview, supra note 9. 
83 Telephone Interview with Ken Mehlman, former Chair, Republican National Committee 
(March 8, 2019). 
84 See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 281, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session
=2&vote=00281 [https://perma.cc/4NTR-2EJD]. 
85 See Aaron Belkin et al., Readiness and DADT Repeal: Has the New Policy of Open Service 
Undermined the Military?, 39 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 587, 588 n.3 (2013). 
86 See AARON BELKIN ET AL., PALM CENTER, ONE YEAR OUT: AN ASSESSMENT OF DADT 
REPEAL’S IMPACT ON MILITARY READINESS 4-5 (2012). 
87 P.W. SINGER, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, HOW THE REAL WORLD ENDED DON’T ASK, 
DON’T TELL 4-5, 8-10 (2008), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/08_military_singer.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DUN-T3KG]. 
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White House Counsel Bob Bauer almost on a daily basis briefed the President 
on legal issues, including the status of the DOMA lawsuits, his and DOJ’s 
thoughts on the level of scrutiny that ought to be applied, and the suggestion 
that the executive branch ought to enforce but refuse to defend DOMA.88 
President Obama, the former professor of constitutional law, understood all 
the arguments and said nothing to discourage counsel from the course being 
developed by the White House Counsel and DOJ. 
On July 8, 2010, District Judge Joseph Tauro issued twin rulings that 
DOMA’s denial of federal marriage or spousal rights violated both the Fifth 
Amendment’s equality guarantees and the federalism limitations on 
Congress’s authority to regulate.89 Because its federalism holding threatened 
other congressional programs and laws, the government would definitely 
appeal the latter ruling. Whether to appeal Judge Tauro’s decision in Gill (the 
GLAD challenge) was a more contentious matter. Normally, the Solicitor 
General makes such a decision, but this was a matter on which other divisions 
of the department weighed in as well.90 
Viewing Gill through the prism of human rights and equal citizenship, the 
Civil Rights Division argued against taking an appeal in Gill or (if an appeal 
were taken) supporting strict scrutiny for sexual orientation-based exclusions. 
They argued that there was an exception to the duty to defend where federal 
law disrespected and treated an honorable minority as outcasts (what might 
be called a Dred Scott exception). As the only federal official with a national 
mandate and an accountability to all the people, the President not only was 
free to abandon class-based laws, but ought to do so.91 The Office of the 
Solicitor General took the opposite point of view, namely, a strong duty to 
defend—essentially the “Sarah Palin argument.” They also did not want to 
expand heightened scrutiny, even for a good cause. Only once in recent 
history had DOJ argued for courts to upgrade scrutiny from rational basis to 
heightened scrutiny, and that was John Roberts’ brief for the United States 
in Metro Broadcasting, not a precedent they wanted to build on. The Civil 
Division was internally divided, but most of its lawyers believed that strict 
scrutiny would not be appropriate in the First Circuit, where precedent tied 
the judges to the position that discrimination against gay people only 
 
88 Interview with Bob Bauer, former White House Counsel, in Washington, D.C. (May 18, 2017). 
89 Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (D. Mass. 2010); Massachusetts v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 249-251 (D. Mass. 2010). The decisions 
were consolidated for purposes of appeal and both affirmed in Massachusetts v. United States 
Department of Health & Human Services, 682 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2012). 
90 The account that follows is based upon my off-the-record interviews with Department of 
Justice officials. 
91 See Johnsen, The Obama Administration’s Decision to Defend Marriage Equality Rather than the 
Defense of Marriage Act, supra note 61, at 608-09. 
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required a rational basis. For that reason, and perhaps others, Attorney 
General Eric Holder authorized an appeal in Gill as well as in the DOMA 
case brought by Massachusetts. 
On January 13, 2011, the Department filed its appellate brief in its appeal 
of Judge Tauro’s DOMA rulings. The Department argued that Congress 
could rationally have concluded that DOMA (1) preserved a national status 
quo at the federal level, while states engage in a period of experimentation, 
(2) created a consistent and easy-to-administer statutory interpretation rule, 
and (3) respected the authority of each state to choose its own course.92 These 
justifications all boiled down to “administrative convenience”—an interest 
everyone realized would not meet any kind of heightened scrutiny.93 
On November 9, 2010, two new DOMA challenges were filed in the 
Second Circuit, where the level of scrutiny question was still open. Robbie 
Kaplan, working with the ACLU, filed Windsor v. United States in New York 
federal court; Mary Bonauto and GLAD filed Pedersen v. Office of Personnel 
Management in Connecticut federal court.94 By then, White House Counsel 
Bob Bauer (based on Team Gay’s research) was telling the President that 
sexual orientation ought to be a suspect classification, that DOMA was 
unconstitutional, and that the administration should enforce DOMA until 
the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional. Bob Bauer was also meeting 
weekly with Eric Holder, so DOJ was aware that White House Counsel and, 
probably, the President were prepared to abandon DOMA in the Second 
Circuit. In the fall of 2010, the President met with gay bloggers who took him 
to task for opposing marriage equality; Obama responded, “Attitudes evolve, 
including mine.”95 
After the filing of the Second Circuit lawsuits, the Attorney General 
asked the relevant divisions what stance the Department should take in a 
circuit that had not determined whether sexual orientation discrimination 
merited heightened scrutiny. The Civil Rights Division weighed in with a 
detailed memorandum arguing that sexual orientation easily met the criteria 
for heightened scrutiny. OLC strongly supported Don’t Defend, Do Enforce. 
In a conference call with Tony West, attorneys in the Civil Division reached 
a rough consensus that the Constitution required heightened scrutiny of 
 
92 Brief for Appellants, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2012)(No. 10-2204), quoted in Joe Siegel, DOJ Files Opening Brief in DOMA Lawsuit, 
RAINBOW TIMES (Jan. 19, 2011) http://www.therainbowtimesmass.com/doj-files-opening-brief-in-
doma-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/DE4Z-5PY6]. 
93 Interview with Stuart Delery, former Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., Dep’t of Justice, 
in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 2, 2016). 
94 See Complaint at 1, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 
1:10CV08435), 2010 WL 5647015; Complaint at 1, Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 
2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012) (No. 3:10CV01750), 2010 WL 4483820. 
95 FRANK, AWAKENING, supra note 31, at 257. 
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sexual orientation discriminations. Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal and 
Deputy Edwin Kneedler carried the flag for the Meltzer position and stood 
virtually alone against the emergent consensus against defending DOMA. 
Although the Attorney General hosted a conference call with the various 
divisions and offices in late January 2011, the result was all but predetermined: 
Don’t Defend, Do Enforce. As Holder knew, the White House was in 
agreement. 
On February 23, 2011, Attorney General Holder delivered a letter to 
House Speaker John Boehner. The letter informed Congress that Windsor and 
Pedersen required the Department to litigate in a circuit that had no precedent 
requiring only rational basis scrutiny for discriminations based on sexual 
orientation. “After careful consideration, including review of my 
recommendation, the President has concluded that given a number of factors, 
including a documented history of discrimination, classifications based on 
sexual orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.” 
Accordingly, “the President has also concluded that Section 3 of DOMA, as 
applied to legally married same-sex couples, fails to meet that standard and 
is therefore unconstitutional.”96 For this reason, the Department was not 
going to defend DOMA, but agencies would “continue to comply with 
Section 3 of DOMA, consistent with the Executive’s obligation to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed, unless and until Congress repeals Section 
3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the law’s 
constitutionality.”97 There was some partisan objection, but there was much 
more support or acquiescence than opposition. For the first time in its polling 
on the issue, the Gallup Poll found in early 2011 that a majority of Americans 
supported marriage equality, 53% to 45%.98 
On April 9, 2011, the House of Representatives’ Bipartisan Legislative 
Advisory Group (BLAG) voted along party lines (three Republicans versus 
two Democrats) to defend DOMA. BLAG retained former Solicitor General 
Paul Clement to defend DOMA. Intervening in the First, Second, and Ninth 
Circuit cases, BLAG opposed heightened scrutiny and argued that DOMA 
was a rational response to problems of statutory administration in the face of 
changing state law and could also be justified as encouragement of responsible 
 
96 Letter from the Eric Holder, Attorney General to John A. Boehner, Speaker, House of 
Representatives 3 (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-
litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act [https://perma.cc/KP39-HNH6]. 
97 Id. at 4. 
98 Frank Newport, For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay Marriage, GALLUP 
(May 20, 2011), https://news.gallup.com/poll/147662/first-time-majority-americans-favor-legal-gay-
marriage.aspx [https://perma.cc/7NBK-HKGQ]. 
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procreation.99 On February 22, 2012, Judge Jeffrey White rejected those 
arguments in Golinski v. United States Office of Personnel Management.100  
VI. THE PRESIDENT COMES OUT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
In the wake of the Holder Letter, progressives stepped up the pressure on 
President Obama to complete his “evolution” from civil unions to full 
marriage equality. Indeed, now that the President had officially adopted the 
position that discrimination against lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons and 
couples ought to be subject to strict scrutiny and had applied that reasoning 
to DOMA, how could he deny that state junior-DOMAs, many of which were 
more sweeping in their anti-gay discrimination, were unconstitutional? In my 
view, the die was cast after the Holder Letter became public—but the 
campaign team insisted that the President not complete his evolution until 
after the election. 
On July 27, 2011, Joel Benenson, the Obama campaign’s lead pollster, and 
Jan van Lohuizen, the lead pollster for George W. Bush, discussed the polls 
showing the majority of Americans supporting marriage equality with the 
media at the National Press Club.101 The pollsters had never seen such a rapid 
volte-face on this kind of divisive social issue. They pointed out that this 
boom reflected across-the-board increases in support from every age group, 
religion, party, and income category.102 Also, “supporters of marriage for gay 
couples feel as strongly about the issue as opponents do, something that was 
not the case in the recent past.”103 The rise in the poll numbers would very 
probably continue, “[a]s Americans currently under the age of 40 make up a 
greater percentage of the electorate.”104 
 
99 E.g., Brief of Intervenor-Appellant Bipartisan Advisory Group, U.S. House of 
Representatives at 39-53, Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 
1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214), 2011 WL 4539095 (BLAG’s administrative and 
responsible procreation arguments, developed in detail). 
100 See 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 990-95 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (rejecting the administrative convenience 
and responsible procreation justifications advanced in the Superseding Opposition of the U.S. 
House of Representatives to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at 20-25, Golinski, 824 F. 
Supp. 2d 968 (No. C 10-00257 JSW), 2011 WL 5119769). 
101 See Memorandum from Joel Benenson & Jan van Lohuisen to Interested Parties (July 27, 
2011) (on file with University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (describing polls reflecting increased 
support for marriage equality). For accounts of the briefing, see Ruth Marcus, Same-Sex Unions, a 
Political Plus, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2011, at A25; Marc Solomon, Secrets of Obama’s Evolution: The 
Inside Story of How the President Backed Gay Marriage, SALON (Nov. 28, 2014), 
https://www.salon.com/2014/11/28/secrets_of_obamas_evolution_the_inside_story_of_how_the_pre
sident_backed_gay_marriage/ [https://perma.cc/4VRX-AU89]. 
102 See Benenson & Lohuisen Memorandum, supra note 101, at 3. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
2019] Presidential Constitutionalism and Marriage Equality 1913 
The poll numbers were complemented by tangible results in the state-by-
state campaign for marriage equality. When Barack Obama was elected 
President, there were three states handing out marriage licenses, one of which 
(California) immediately ceased because of Proposition 8. There were five 
states with civil unions or comprehensive domestic partnerships and five 
states with another institution granting some marriage rights to registered 
couples. In 2009, during President Obama’s first year in office, three states 
(Vermont, New Hampshire, Iowa) and the District of Columbia granted full 
marriage rights (Maine’s legislature granted such rights but was overridden 
later in the year by a popular referendum), two more established 
comprehensive domestic partnerships, and one state created limited 
partnership rights. In 2010-11, while the Obama Administration was moving 
toward its constitutional renunciation of DOMA, four more states adopted 
civil unions. In California, District Judge Vaughn Walker ruled that 
California’s Proposition 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment and entered 
an injunction for marriage equality in August 2010 (he immediately stayed its 
effect during the inevitable appeals process). On June 15, 2011, the New York 
Legislature passed and Governor Cuomo signed the Marriage Equality Act. 
In February and March 2012, governors signed marriage equality laws in 
Washington and Maryland. Those laws would be subject to referenda in 
November 2012, when an initiative to establish marriage equality would also 
be on the ballot in Maine. 
 
Figure 1: The Marriage Map, March 2012105 
 
 
105 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & CHRISTOPHER R. RIANO, FROM OUTLAWS TO INLAWS: 
THE MARRIAGE DEBATE, 1967–2017, app. 1 (forthcoming 2020). 
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The nineteen red or blue states in Figure 1, where same-sex relationships 
were recognized in some way, were states where President Obama was 
strongly favored to win in his 2012 reelection effort—but those states would 
not be enough to prevail in the Electoral College. The President needed to 
win states like Pennsylvania and Michigan, whose electorate remained 
intensely divided on the marriage issue. Campaign Manager Jim Messina 
and other political advisers strongly preferred that any presidential 
conversion on the marriage issue come after the election. In February, acting 
on an idea hatched by its political director Marc Solomon, Freedom to 
Marry launched a “Democrats: Say I Do” campaign.106 House Minority 
Leader Nancy Pelosi was among the first to take the pledge: “We support 
the full inclusion of all families in the life of our nation, with equal respect, 
responsibilities, and protections under the law, including the freedom to 
marry . . . .”107 The White House was okay with a platform that went further 
than the President was willing to go but was sticking with the timeline 
suggested by the political team.108 
On Friday May 4, 2012, Vice President Joe Biden taped a segment of Meet 
the Press that would air the following Sunday. Although his preparation had 
focused almost exclusively on the economy, gay families were on his mind. In 
April 2012, he had appeared at a Los Angeles fundraiser held at the home of 
a gay couple raising two children, ages four and seven.109 “I wish everybody 
could see this,” the Vice President gushed to the donors.110 “All you got to do 
is look in the eyes of those kids. And no one can wonder, no one can wonder 
whether or not they are cared for and nurtured and loved and reinforced.” 111 
He continued: “Things are changing so rapidly, it’s going to become a 
political liability in the near term for an individual to say, ‘I oppose gay 
marriage.’ Mark my words.”112 
Nonetheless, the Vice President’s staff were caught entirely off guard 
when he launched into a discussion of marriage during his Meet the Press 
taping. As Biden put it, marriage was very simple: “Who do you love? And 
will you be loyal to the person you love? [That is] what all marriages, at their 
root, are about. Whether they’re marriages of lesbians or gay men or 
heterosexuals.”113 Host David Gregory followed up: “And you’re comfortable 
 
106 Solomon, supra note 101. 
107 Id.; ELEVELD, supra note 15, at 241-43. 
108 The judgment in text is based upon off-the-record conversations with the Vice-President’s 
staff and with White House officials. 
109 JO BECKER, FORCING THE SPRING: INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 285 (2014). 
110 Id. at 286. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast May 6, 2012); see also May 6: Joe Biden, Kelly Ayotte, 
Diane Swonk, Tom Brokaw, Chuck Todd, TRANSCRIPTS ON MEET THE PRESS (May 6, 2012, 12:57 
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with same-sex marriage now?”114 The Vice President opined: “I am absolutely 
comfortable with the fact that men marrying men, women marrying women, 
and heterosexual men and women marrying one another are entitled to the 
same exact rights, all the civil rights, all the civil liberties.”115 After a bit of 
rambling, Biden closed with the joy he felt in Los Angeles. “I wish every 
American could see the look of love those kids had in their eyes for [their two 
dads]. And they wouldn’t have any doubt about what this is about.”116 
The standard story line is that this was another example of Joe Biden’s 
lovable-but-aggravating spontaneity,117 but sources close to the Vice President 
believe that Biden’s remarks were far from a goofy gaffe.118 Instead, this was 
the Vice President’s sincere expression of a long-considered public policy 
position and a gambit calculated to turn up the heat on the President. The 
most politically experienced person in the Obama Administration, Joe Biden 
was certain that the marriage issue would energize the President’s base of 
support, with negative reactions confined to voters who would not have voted 
for him in the first place. Although the presidential campaign team did not 
see matters that way, the DNC politely informed them that there was no 
walking back the Vice President’s confession. Apparently, Barack Obama 
reacted more mildly than his protective campaign officials. He joshed that Joe 
had “gotten ahead of his skis” on this issue but also seemed relieved. The 
White House arranged a television interview with Robin Roberts, the 
charismatic host of Good Morning America, for Wednesday, May 9, 2012.119 
Barack Obama offered his own journey story. “I had hesitated on gay 
marriage, in part, because I thought civil unions would be sufficient. . . . I was 
sensitive to the fact that, for a lot of people . . . the word marriage was 




[hereinafter Meet the Press Transcript]. 
114 Meet the Press Transcript, supra note 113. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 See Chris Cillizza, The Amazing Honesty of Joe Biden, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/09/10/the-amazing-honesty-of-joe-
biden/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3ff1cac4dfe4 [https://perma.cc/9FL7-PS8F] (depicting Biden as 
honest and “spontaneous,” but sometimes prone to gaffes). 
118 The account in text is taken from the author’s off-the-record interviews with several Biden aides. 
119 The interview closely followed the suggestions made in an email from Bush’s 2004 
Campaign Manager Ken Mehlman to Obama’s 2012 Campaign Manager David Plouffe, Nov. 10, 
2011. See Email from Ken Mehlman to William Eskridge (July 9, 2019, 3:25 PM) (on file with 
author). 
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forth.”120 But this was not a stable belief. Over several years, Obama discussed 
the issue with friends, family, and coworkers, some raising children within 
their relationships or marriages.121 He contemplated the gay soldiers, laying 
down their lives for their country, yet “constrained” by the fact that they could 
not get married like everyone else.122 “At a certain point, I’ve just concluded 
that, for me personally, it is important for me to go ahead and affirm that I 
think same-sex couples should be able to get married.”123 The President 
emphasized the influence of his wife Michelle and his daughters Malia and 
Sasha. “You know, Malia and Sasha, they’ve got friends whose parents are 
same-sex couples. . . . [T]here have been times where Michelle and I have 
been sitting around the dinner table. And we’ve been talking about their 
friends and their parents. And Malia and Sasha, it wouldn’t dawn on them 
that somehow their friends’ parents would be treated differently.”124 
After the President’s compelling narrative, the Vice President was 
vindicated. Young and progressive voters were energized by the President’s 
support for marriage equality, and LGBTQ+ contributions poured into the 
campaign coffers.125 The Republicans nominated Mitt Romney, who chose 
not to make marriage a major issue in the campaign. In November, not only 
did President Obama win a decisive reelection, but Ken Mehlman’s political 
analysts estimated that his support for marriage equality netted him 233,000 
extra votes in the “battleground” states that he carried by just over 500,000 
votes overall.126 And, to the surprise of pundits, marriage equality advocates 
won popular votes in Maine, Minnesota, Maryland, and Washington.127 The 
2012 vote did not end deep differences of opinion about marriage equality, 
but it was a quasi-referendum on the issue that suggested majority 
endorsement or acquiescence at both the national and state levels (not all 
states, of course). 
 







125 CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, ANALYSIS OF THE 2012 MARRIAGE 
CAMPAIGNS (2014). 
126  Memorandum from Alicia Downs & Alex Lundry, Target Point Consulting, to Project 
Right Side, 10 Key Data Points on Marriage Equality (Nov. 7, 2010) (analyzing marriage issue for 
Obama’s reelection). 
127 See CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, supra note 125. 
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VII. UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR 
The 2012 election gave a big boost to the Holder Letter advocating 
heighted scrutiny for and invalidation of DOMA’s section 3. By then, there 
were appellate decisions in the First and Second Circuits invalidating section 
3.128 The Second Circuit decision in United States v. Windsor followed the 
Holder Letter to hold that sexual orientation classifications required 
heightened scrutiny, and then held that none of BLAG’s justifications met 
that standard.129 Both the United States and BLAG filed petitions for 
Supreme Court review in Windsor and the other cases.130 The Court granted 
review for two questions in Windsor: Did the United States and/or BLAG 
have constitutional standing to seek review? Did DOMA violate the Fifth 
Amendment?131 On the same day, the Court granted review for Hollingsworth 
v. Perry and posed two similar issues: Did the initiative proponents have 
standing to appeal the lower court judgments invalidating Proposition 8? Did 
Proposition 8 violate the Fourteenth Amendment?132 
Committed to the principles and the doctrinal analysis embraced by the 
President, Solicitor General Don Verrilli, his deputy Sri Srinivasan, and 
Assistant Attorney General Stuart Delery (who worked with the Solicitor 
General on this issue) faced several puzzles. First, they would have to argue 
that the United States was harmed by the Second Circuit’s judgment, even 
though it had closely followed the government’s brief. Was it enough to say 
that the government was harmed because it would have to refund Edie 
Windsor’s estate tax payment? Second, should the government hedge its bets 
on the merits by arguing that, even if the Supreme Court did not create a 
new (quasi-)suspect classification, the “more searching scrutiny” required by 
Romer v. Evans (1996) would also be fatal to DOMA, which was saturated 
with the same kind of anti-gay “animus” that was found in the Colorado 
initiative invalidated in Romer? The centerpiece of the Solicitor General’s 
brief was the case for heightened scrutiny, but it also made the Romer 
 
128 United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2012); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012). 
129 Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185-88. 
130 Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Pedersen, 570 
U.S. 932 (2013) (No. 12-302), 2012 WL 3991479; Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, 
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Golinski, 570 U.S. 931 (2013) (No. 12-16), 2012 WL 2586938; Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Massachusetts, 570 U.S. 931 (2013) (No. 
12-15), 2012 WL 2586937; Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, United States v. Windsor, 
568 U.S. 1066 (2012) (No. 12-63), 2012 WL 2904038. See also Brief for the United States, Windsor, 
586 U.S. 1066 (No. 12-63), 2012 WL 3838138 (urging the Court to take review in the First and Ninth 
Circuit cases and to hold the Second Circuit cases). 
131 Windsor, 568 U.S. at 1066. 
132 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 568 U.S. 1066 (2012). 
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argument, the first time the federal government had recognized “rational 
basis with bite” at the Supreme Court.133 
The thorniest puzzle was whether to file an amicus brief in Perry. 
Heightened scrutiny for marriage exclusions under the Fifth Amendment 
(Windsor) would automatically carry over to the Fourteenth Amendment 
(Perry), which would be fatal for all the remaining state DOMAs. But a fifty-
state solution for Perry might undermine the government’s chances for 
sweeping away DOMA in Windsor. The government was doubtful that the 
Court would be willing to require nationwide marriage equality in 2013. 
Hence, their amicus brief in Perry argued for an eight-state solution: Under 
heightened scrutiny, the eight states (like California) that gave all or most 
marital benefits to same-sex couples through comprehensive civil union or 
domestic partnership laws were in an especially weak position, because they 
were endorsing gay relationships as a policy matter but formally giving them 
second-class status.134 If the Court reached the merits in Perry, it could write 
a narrow opinion. 
As the foregoing discussion reflects, presidential constitutionalism not 
only includes strategic considerations, but it will be subject to the 
institutional preferences of the other branches of government. At oral 
argument and in conference for the two cases, the Justices showed little 
interest in recognizing a new (quasi-)suspect classification. The Chief Justice 
had his way in Perry, where he cobbled together an odd majority (Scalia, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) for an opinion dismissing the appeal for lack 
of Article III standing for the Proposition 8 proponents.135 In Windsor, the 
Chief Justice lost his Article III majority, and the government’s alternative 
argument, grounded upon Romer, prevailed. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for a 
5-4 Court found that the United States had constitutional standing and that 
DOMA’s section 3 violated the Fifth Amendment.136 At oral argument, 
Verrilli had maintained that DOMA was generated by “moral disapproval” of 
homosexuality, to quote the June 1996 House Judiciary Committee’s report, 
as well as floor statements by the sponsors.137 “This is discrimination in its 
most very basic aspect,” deeply inconsistent with the equal treatment of the 
 
133 Brief for the United States on the Merits Question at 51-53, United States v. Windsor, 570 
U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 683048. 
134 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9-12, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 769326. 
135 Perry, 570 U.S. at 700-01; see also Brief of Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents on the Issue of Standing at 2-3, Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. 693 (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 
768643. 
136 Windsor, 570 U.S. at 763, 775. 
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law guaranteed by the Constitution.138 With a lot of detours (such as an 
extended ode to family law federalism) and broad rhetoric, Kennedy’s opinion 
pretty much rested upon this logic.139 
Under the supervision of Assistant Attorney General Delery, the Obama 
Administration implemented Windsor with a careful agency-by-agency process 
of incorporating same-sex marriages into statutory schemes.140 In the process, 
Delery’s team made important policy decisions, such as including marriages 
valid in the state of their celebration even if the couple lived in a non-recognition 
state. One decision had an immediate ripple effect on state marriage campaigns: 
the administration declined to treat civil unions or comprehensive domestic 
partnerships as marriages for purposes of Windsor, which meant that the seven 
remaining separate-but-equal state regimes were far from equal. (California 
converted to marriage equality immediately after Perry.) Like dominoes, all 
seven states converted to marriage within a year of Windsor—three by 
constitutional court decisions141 and four by statute.142 By means of the plan for 
implementing Windsor, the Obama Administration, with the support of 
LGBTQ+ litigators and lobbyists, secured the result that its Perry amicus brief 
had advocated: any state that considered lesbian and gay unions entitled to the 
legal benefits of marriage had to give them the name as well. 
VIII. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES 
Justice Scalia dramatically advanced the cause of marriage equality, for he 
provided the fifth vote to dismiss the appeal in Perry (which left the trial 
court’s marriage equality mandate in place) and wrote a Windsor dissenting 
opinion carefully demonstrating that the majority’s reasoning for striking 
down DOMA was, with minimal editing, easily applied to strike down state 
marriage exclusions everywhere.143 “By formally declaring anyone opposed to 
same-sex marriage an enemy of human decency, the majority arms well every 
challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional definition.”144 
 
138 Id. at 1:33:24. 
139 Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)); id. at 770-71. 
140 See Delery Interview, supra note 93. 
141 See Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-CV-0187, 2014 WL 3634834 (D. Colo. July 23, 2014) (first 
licenses issued July 10, 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014) (first licenses 
issued May 19, 2014); Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.), stay 
denied, 79 A.3d 1036 (N.J. 2013) (first licenses issued October 21, 2013). 
142 Civil Marriage Equality and Religious Freedom Act of 2013 § 1, 79 Del. Laws 19 (first 
licenses issued July 1, 2014); Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013 § 2, 2014 Haw. Sess. Laws 1 (2013) 
(first licenses issued December 2, 2013); Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act, Pub. Act 
98-597, Ill. Laws 7141 (2013); (first licenses issued June 1, 2014); Act of May 2, 2013, ch. 5 § 1, 2013 
R.I. Pub. Laws 15 (first licenses issued August 1, 2013). 
143 See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 799-800 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 800. 
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This language was the late Justice’s early Christmas gift to LGBTQ+ rights 
organizations, which brought or joined constitutional lawsuits in all the states 
that did not embrace marriage equality. 
While the Obama Administration implemented Windsor in ways that 
ensured victory in some of these lawsuits, most of the work of bringing 
marriage equality to national fruition was accomplished—as it had been 
accomplished before 2009—by plaintiff couples, movement litigators, grass-
roots organizers, donors from all walks of life, and ordinary Americans who 
came out of the closet as LGBTQ+ or as committed same-sex partners and 
spouses or as parents or relatives of gay couples. Between Windsor and 
Obergefell v. Hodges, federal district court judgments accepting constitutional 
challenges to marriage exclusions (many citing Justice Scalia) were successful 
in twenty-eight states, and the Tenth, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
held that these exclusions violated the Fourteenth Amendment.145 In a 
stunning development, the Supreme Court in October 2014 denied review or 
stays of marriage equality decisions from all four courts of appeals.146 By the 
end of November 2014, the marriage map looked completely different than it 
had at the beginning of the Obama Administration. 
 
Figure 2: The Marriage Map, November 2014147 
 
145 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608-11 (2015) (listing district court, circuit court, 
and state court marriage decisions, 2013–15). 
146 Otter v. Latta, 135 S. Ct. 345 (2014) (vacating stay of Ninth Circuit’s mandate in Idaho and 
Nevada marriage cases); Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) (denying review for the Wisconsin 
marriage case); Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) (denying review for the Indiana marriage 
case); Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014) (denying review for the Virginia marriage case); Bishop 
v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014) (denying review for the Oklahoma marriage case); Herbert v. Kitchen, 
135 S. Ct. 265 (2014) (denying review for the Utah marriage case). 
147 See ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 105. 
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In January 2015, the Court did take review of the first post-Windsor court 
of appeals decision rejecting marriage equality claims. Although almost 
everyone expected the Court to require nationwide marriage equality in 
Obergefell, the oral argument on April 28, 2015 gave the Obama 
Administration one more star turn. At the conclusion of Mary Bonauto’s oral 
argument for the challengers, a man with crazy white hair stood up and 
bellowed, “If you support gay marriage, you will burn in hell!” Even after he 
was removed from the courtroom, you could hear his screams of damnation 
from the marbled hallway.148 
Unfazed by the homophobic outburst and by Justice Scalia’s crack that it 
was “refreshing,” Solicitor General Verrilli calmly answered the primary 
argument raised by the states, that the redefinition of marriage should be left 
to the political process.149 Inspired by a conversation he had with the 
President in the Oval Office, Verrilli advised that if the Court ruled that the 
constitutional claims should be left to the political process, it was saying that 
gay people’s second-class citizenship was consistent with the equal protection 
of the law. “That is not a wait-and-see. That is a validation.”150 The Court had 
rejected the same wait-and-see argument in Lawrence, which was “an 
important catalyst that has brought us to where we are today. And I think 
what Lawrence did was provide an assurance that gay and lesbian couples 
could live openly in society as free people and start families and raise families 
and participate fully in their communities without fear.”151 Many of us in the 
courtroom felt like standing and applauding. Given the fate of the man with 
the crazy white hair, no one did that, but you could hear sniffles and sobs 
throughout the courtroom. 
On June 26, 2015, a 5–4 Supreme Court ruled that the four state marriage 
exclusions (and implicitly those of the other states) violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.152 
IX. THE POWER AND LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
One lesson of the foregoing account is the interconnection among the 
various forms of administrative constitutionalism outlined at the beginning 
 
148 See Oral Argument at 27:09, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556 [https://perma.cc/7MLP-HNLH]. The author attended the 
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149 Id. at 28:28. 
150 Id. at 28:51. 
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152 Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2602-08. 
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of this article. Throughout President Obama’s tenure—Team Gay’s 
deliverables, the DOJ and White House deliberations, and Delery’s 
implementation of Windsor—the executive department was integrating its 
small “c” constitutional vision of step-by-step equal citizenship for sexual and 
gender minorities with the Large “C” Constitutional arguments suggested by 
established doctrine and with the text and purposes of the great federal 
statutory schemes, including social security, the tax code, veterans benefits, 
and federal employment law. In my view, this is typical of administrative 
constitutionalism generally: executive officials normally approach big 
questions framed by their understandings of the nation’s fundamental 
commitments, the duties imposed by the Constitution, and the grand 
purposes of the relevant statutes (and super-statutes). 
Another lesson is the interaction of substance and procedure. The Obama 
Administration had a substantive theory of sexuality, gender, and equality but 
believed that the country was not ready for the full ramifications of that 
theory in 2009. The process by which the administration pressed the theory—
a trial balloon here, a reinterpretation there, a new philosophy for DOJ briefs 
in the military and marriage exclusion cases—was important because it 
generated judicial, political, and popular feedback. LGBTQ+ leaders felt the 
administration was moving too slowly, and congressional Republicans felt it 
was moving too quickly, but the President wisely believed that the best 
process was one where he provided some extra push for the social movement 
and, importantly, created conditions for examination and falsification of the 
anti-gay stereotypes that held back support for equal rights. That is why 
Obama was wise to seek an end to the military ban first, for the reality of 
valorous gay soldiers demonstrated that LGBTQ+ people were contributing 
to society and the lack of negative consequences refuted beliefs that the sky 
would fall if “the gays” were promoted to equal citizenship. 
The marriage narrative illustrates the potential power of presidential 
constitutionalism. It is most likely to be influential and robust under the 
following circumstances: 
• The President articulates a principled constitutional vision that 
is well-grounded in a widely shared norm (equal treatment for all 
citizens) and produces interim and long-term consequences that 
are on the whole admirable (and far from the Pandora’s box 
concerns raised by opponents). 
• The administration uses its first-mover advantage to proceed 
deliberatively and cautiously, not pressing its ideas too far or too 
fast. Little experiments or trial balloons are useful strategies. 
Don’t make a bold final move if it is likely to be successfully 
blocked. 
2019] Presidential Constitutionalism and Marriage Equality 1923 
• Using the bully pulpit and media advantages of the presidency, 
the executive branch seeks to persuade other institutions to 
follow its lead and citizens to consider its arguments and the 
consequences of its actions. 
Conversely, presidential constitutionalism faces certain limits: 
• If the small “c” constitutional principle is rotten or inconsistent 
with the nation’s traditions or imposes discernible and significant 
costs on society or ordinary Americans, it will be divisive and 
may engender bad reactions. 
• Presidents cycle out of office after one or two terms (4–8 years), 
and the successor usually has a different set of priorities, 
sometimes vastly different. So there is plenty of room for 
presidential constitutionalism to cycle: the new President can 
unravel the policies of his/her/their predecessor. But when a 
presidential initiative becomes rapidly entrenched, subsequent 
occupants of the White House will not be inclined or successful 
in dislodging it. Still, they can use their own bully pulpit to cabin 
the consequences of the earlier innovation. 
• Other branches of the federal government or the states might 
strongly resist, either immediately or after the next election. The 
debate engendered by resistance can sometimes help entrench 
the President’s initiatives, but if resistance finds resonance in 
people’s experience and values, it can prevail. As before, it makes 
a big difference whether the presidential initiative imposes 
immediate and significant costs on society. 
Although President Obama’s successor could not have had more different 
values, constitutional and otherwise, it is notable that gays in the military and 
marriage equality are legacies that his successor has not tried to dislodge or 
even criticize. Unlike the Obama Administration’s immigration, 
environmental, and health care measures, which have been significantly rolled 
back, marriage equality has become entrenched, in part because it has helped 
a lot of families and seems to have harmed few if any Americans. On the other 
hand, the Trump Administration, through judicial appointments, executive 
orders, and agency actions, is carving out religious-based exceptions to the 
marriage equality principle. Even when successful in entrenching a public 
norm, presidential constitutionalism assures dynamic interpretation 
(including limiting precepts) for that norm across different administrations. 
The fruits of presidential constitutionalism usually constitute the primary 
legacies of presidential administrations. Overall, the Obama White House 
was wise to choose marriage equality as one of its signature initiatives, 
because (1) there was a large and growing number of Americans, widely 
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dispersed throughout the country, who personally benefitted from 
recognition of LGBTQ+ marital families; (2) recognition of those marriages 
was not expected to be tangibly harmful to other Americans or costly to 
society; and (3) an impressive and well-funded collection of institutions and 
organizations were prepared to oppose significant curtailments like tigers 
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